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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper examines the history of U.S. interventions in 
Latin America and attempts to explain their frequency by 
highlighting two factors—besides security and economic 
interests--that have made American interventions in Latin 
America so common. First, immense differences in size and 
influence between the United States and the States of Latin 
America have made interventions appear to be a low risk 
solution to crises that threaten American interests in the 
region. Second, when U.S government concerns and 
aspirations for Latin America converge with the general fears 
and aspirations of American foreign policy, interventions 
become much more likely. Such a convergence pushes Latin 
American issues high up the U.S. foreign policy agenda 
because of the region’s proximity to the United States and 
the perception that the costs of intervening are low.  The 
leads proponents of intervention to begin asking questions 
like “if we cannot stop communism/revolutions/drug-
trafficking in Latin America, where can we stop it?”  
 
This article traces how these factors influenced the decision 
to intervene in Latin America during the era of Dollar 
Diplomacy and during the Cold War. It concludes with three 
possible scenarios that could lead to a reemergence of an 
American interventionist policy in Latin America.  It makes 
the argument that even though the United States has not 
intervened in Latin America during the twenty-two years, it 
is far from clear that American interventions in Latin 
America will be consigned to the past. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
In 2001, Robert Pastor published an expanded second edition 
of his widely acclaimed study of the dynamics of U.S.-Latin 
American relations A Whirlpool: U.S Foreign Policy towards 
Latin America and the Caribbean only under a new title, 
Exiting the Whirlpool, which argued that the future of U.S.-
Latin American relations was not necessarily a hostage of its 
past.1 In the short-term he appears to have been right. 
December 2011 should bring about a new milestone in the 
history of U.S.-Latin American relations. Baring any 
unforeseen actions this will mark the 22nd anniversary of 
Operation Just Cause making it the longest period in U.S.-
Latin American relations without a unilateral American 
intervention since the Spanish American War.2 By some 
counts the United States has intervened in Latin America 
hundreds of times during the last 150 years. These 
interventions ranged from short-term missions to protect 
American lives and property to full military occupations, that 
included imposition of military governments, American 
administered financial sectors, and American supervised 
elections.  
 
Military interventions have been a regular fixture in the 
history of American foreign relations with the region since 
the 1890s, with the exception of two periods: the “Good 
Neighbor” era between 1932 and 1954 and from 1989 to the 
                                                 
1 Robert A. Pastor, A Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1992), and Robert A. Pastor. Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy 
Toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
2001). 
2 Operation Just Cause was the name of the U.S. Military operation that 
removed Manuel Noriega from power in Panama. 
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present. This later period now needs to be recognized as a 
significant era in the history of U.S.-Latin American 
relations. However, it would be naïve to think that this is an 
entirely new era of U.S.-Latin American relations and that 
interventions are now consigned to the past.  By surveying 
the history of American interventions in Latin America and 
paying special attention to the contexts from which they 
emerged, this essay will offer an explanation why American 
interventions  have been so frequent. Finally, this essay will 
examine the possible developments in U.S.-Latin American 
relations that could lead to a reemergence of a policy of 
intervention.  
 
Defining what is and is not an American “intervention” in 
Latin America is a complicated issue. All States do their best 
to influence the policies of other States in ways that are 
favorable to them through diplomacy. At what point these 
attempts cease to be diplomatic and begin to be interventions 
depends on the criteria chosen. Two criteria will be used in 
the definition of intervention in this essay. The first is 
whether American uniformed military personnel were 
unilaterally deployed for the purpose of obtaining a political 
objective. The second is whether the U.S. military and 
intelligence communities played a decisive role in 
empowering a domestic faction to bring about a political 
change that was favored by the United States. By these 
criteria most landings of U.S. troops during the Dollar 
Diplomacy era (1905-1932) and Operation Just Cause in 
1989 would be considered interventions while the U.S. 
response to the Haitian Earthquake of 2010 would not. 
Similarly U.S. operation PBSUCCESS in Guatemala in 1954  
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and the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961 would be 
considered interventions.3 
 
EXPLAINING AMERICAN INTERVENTIONS IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
 
The frequency of American armed interventions in Latin 
America during the 20th Century has made them a topic of 
much debate. Scholars attempting to explain these 
interventions can generally be placed into two categories: 
apologists and prosecutors. The apologists explain American 
interventions by arguing that American policymakers have 
genuinely believed that Latin America is an area of vital 
importance to the United States and so it has intervened there 
repeatedly in the name of national security, even if in 
retrospect some of these threats appear to have been 
exaggerated.4 The prosecutors reject any explanations that 
maintain American security concerns in the region were 
                                                 
3 Not all incidents in U.S. Latin-American relations can be neatly 
categorized according to these criteria. For example it is unclear whether 
or not the CIA played a “decisive” role in the 1973 coup that killed 
Chilean President Salvador Allende or whether American support for the 
Nicaraguan Contras played a “decisive” role in the Sandinista electoral 
defeat in 1990. However, decisive or not, both of these incidents 
produced political fallout in Latin America similar to that of more clear 
cases of intervention and so are more similar in their effects to the type of 
intervention considered in this essay regardless of how they are 
classified. 
4 For a sampling of the “apologists” see, G. Pope Atkins, Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1999); Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the 
United States (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and company, 1943); 
Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 
1900-1921 (Princeton, IN: Princeton University Press, 1964); Thomas 
Leonard, Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1991). 
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genuine. Instead, they decry these interventions as 
neocolonial ventures attempting to establish American 
economic and cultural dominance in the region.5  
 
The arguments of each group have some merit. American 
security and economic interests in the region are real and 
have from time to time been threatened. However, both 
arguments fail to give a plausible explanation for why 
American policymakers have so frequently chosen 
intervention as a means to defend American interests there. 
The “prosecutors” that claim that economics and power were 
primary motivations fails to explain why the United States 
intervened most frequently in the areas where Americans had 
the least invested, such as  Nicaragua, the Dominican 
Republic, and Haiti. Also while there is evidence that 
American business interests certainly have lobbied the State 
Department to defend their interests,  there is little evidence 
that this lobbying had much effect.6 The “apologists” also 
have difficulty explaining why the United States resorted to 
interventions to defend their security interests in the region 
when other policies could have addressed their concerns just 
as effectively. For example denying foreign powers the right 
                                                 
5 A few examples of the “prosecutors” would be Harold Denny, Dollars 
for Bullets: The Story of American Rule in Nicaragua (Westport,  CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1980); Karl Bermann, Under the Big Stick: Nicaragua 
and the United States Since 1848 (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1986); 
Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and 
the Rise of the New Imperialism, (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 
2006); Stephen C Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The 
Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, Anchor Books ed. 
(New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1990). 
6 For a detailed study of the American business lobby’s activities during 
Dollar Diplomacy see Benjamin T Harrison, Dollar Diplomat: Chandler 
Anderson and American Diplomacy in Mexico and Nicaragua, 1913-
1928 (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1988). See also 
the discussion of the 1954 intervention in Guatemala below. 
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to intervene in Latin America could probably have been 
accomplished through American naval power alone by the 
beginning of the 20th Century, and such a policy would have 
undoubtedly had the support of the majority of Latin 
American nations. That the United States chose to forestall 
foreign interventions with their own interventions certainly 
requires more explanation than just concerns over security.  
 
Besides security and economic interests there are two 
additional factors that need to be taken into consideration in 
order to understand the frequency of American interventions 
in Latin America. First, the vast differences in size, wealth, 
and perceived influence between the United States and the 
republics of Latin America make interventions more likely 
because these immense differences have often caused 
American policymakers to overestimate their ability to effect 
change in the region. This recurring miscalculation makes 
interventions seem like low risk and relatively simple 
solutions when political turmoil threatens U.S interests. This 
miscalculation is sustained by interventions that have turned 
out to be every bit as easy as they were supposed to be, such 
as the 1954 overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in 
Guatemala and the 1989 overthrow of Manuela Noriega in 
Panama, both of which obtained their objectives with 
minimal costs to the U.S. in the short term. The same 
miscalculation can also make the costs of not intervening 
seem high in certain political climates. For example, during 
the Cold War the cost of intervening in Latin America 
seemed to pale in comparison to the political cost of 
allowing a “second Cuba” to be created in Latin America, as 
Jimmy Carter would find out when he was constantly 
hounded by Republicans for having “lost” Nicaragua after 
1979. In short one of the reasons that the U.S. has intervened 
so frequently in Latin America is because the cost of doing 
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so in many situations has seemed lower than the cost of not 
intervening.  
 
Second, interventions are more likely to occur when 
American fears about or aspirations regarding Latin America 
coincide with the major fears and aspirations of American 
foreign policy at the time. Such a convergence pushes Latin 
American issues high up the U.S. foreign policy agenda 
because of their proximity to the United States and, since the 
costs of intervention in Latin America are perceived to be 
low, proponents of intervention eventually begin asking 
questions like “if we cannot stop communism/ 
revolutions/drug-trafficking in Latin America, where can we 
stop it?”  For example American fears about the spread of 
communism in general during the Cold War made anxiety 
over its presence in Latin America particularly extreme. 
Conversely, when the dominant fears and issues of U.S. 
foreign policy do not coincide with those Americans have 
about Latin America, intervention is unlikely. For example 
when Nicaraguan President and Sandinista leader Daniel 
Ortega came to power in 1979 there was such widespread 
fear among conservative American policymakers that it 
eventually led to covert operations against the Sandinistas, 
culminating in the Iran-Contra scandal. However, when 
Ortega came to power through elections again in 2007, 
George W. Bush telephoned him to say congratulations.7 In 
1979 Ortega’s rise coincided with what was believed to be a 
global resurgence of communism, whereas in 2007 Ortega’s 
return to power in Nicaragua was no way connected to the 
dominate issues in American foreign policy: global terrorism 
and two foreign wars.  
                                                 
7 “Bush Congratulates New Nicaraguan President Ortega,” Reuters 
News, January 8, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/01/08/us-
nicaragua-ortega-bush-idUSN0827392320070108. 
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BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY 
 
These two factors, the supposed low cost of interventions 
and the convergence of Latin American issues with those of 
U.S. foreign policy in general, can be seen driving American 
interventions in the Caribbean Basin as early as the Spanish 
American War. Behind the jingoism that jauntily encouraged 
the U.S. to go to war with Spain was the argument that the 
vast resource of the U.S. made victory all but inevitable, if 
war broke out. The cost of liberating Cuba seemed so low 
that it would be a mistake not to do it. At the same time 
removing the Spanish from Cuba was a step towards 
achieving many of the goals of early 20
th
 Century U.S. 
foreign policy for the region, which included continuing to 
minimize European influence in Latin America. Among 
others, historian Kristin L. Hoganson has suggested a more 
subtle convergence between the war and broader societal 
issues by arguing that gender issues played a role in the 
decision to go to war. A generation of American men raised 
in the relatively comfortable and prosperous post-Civil War 
Era worried that they were loosing the rugged nature of their 
forebears and a war would be an excellent way of claiming a 
more martial masculinity.
8
 
 
After the Spanish American War the United States took on a 
much more active role in Latin America, particularly the 
Caribbean Basin, and from 1905-1933 occupied Cuba, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic for extended periods 
of time, and landed troops in many more countries ostensibly 
to end revolutions and maintain stability. This period is 
generally known as the Dollar Diplomacy era, after the 
policy of President William Taft (1909 - 1912), which 
                                                 
8
 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000). 
 9 
 
attempted to end instability in the region through a mixture 
of interventions and investments. There were both economic 
and strategic motivations for these interventions. From the 
perspective of American policymakers frequent 
“revolutions” throughout the Caribbean Basin damaged 
American property and investments and if these revolutions 
were not checked, they might serve as a pretext for European 
interventions. Ironically, this had been the case for much of 
the late 19th century in the Caribbean Basin. Thus, the Dollar 
Diplomacy era was different because of the convergence 
between the issues of the Caribbean Basin and American 
fears and aspirations in foreign policy. Dollar Diplomacy 
coincided with the resurgence of European colonialism in 
Africa and Asia, which many believed was isolating the 
United States from economic opportunities abroad. The fear 
that this colonialism could be extended to the Caribbean 
Basin motivated American policymakers to take action to 
stop it.9 Dollar Diplomacy also coincided with the height of 
the progressive movement in the United States and its 
impulse to bring reform. The success of reform movements 
at home turned the attention of the progressive’s abroad and 
created an American political environment that was receptive 
to the idea of intervention.10 Finally, these interventions were 
also undertaken with the belief that they would be easy. Dana 
G. Munro, a diplomat-turned-scholar, who spent his years as 
a diplomat embroiled in these interventions and then spent 
                                                 
9 Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 
1900-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 5 - 7. 
10 For an overview of the internationalism of American progressives see 
Alan Daley, Changing the World: American Progressives in War and 
Revolution (Princeton  N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); For  work 
dealing the progressives in Latin America during the era see, Emily 
Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and 
Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930 (Cambridge,  MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
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his years as a scholar trying to explain them, concluded that 
one of the reasons interventions were so prevalent during this 
period was that intervening in “small weak states” seemed to 
involve little risk or expense, while the potential benefits 
seemed enormous.11 
 
The best example is the decision to intervene in Nicaragua in 
1912, which resulted in a nearly constant American presence 
there until 1932.12 Beginning with Secretary of State 
Philander Knox’s decision to support a revolution against 
Nicaraguan President José Santos Zelaya and his immediate 
successors, American statesmen moved hesitantly down a 
path of attempting to turn Nicaragua into country that was 
both stable and prosperous. By doing so they could limit the 
likelihood of European intervention and also prove the 
desirability and effectiveness of American led reforms. In 
exchange for recognizing the rebels that overthrew Zelaya, 
the State Department urged the leaders of the revolution to 
sign a series of agreements known as the Dawson Pacts 
which they believed would put Nicaragua on a path towards 
democracy and financial stability. What they did not seem to 
consider is what would happen if the new leaders of 
Nicaragua did not abide by these pacts. The plan began to 
break down almost immediately and in 1912, the former 
Minister of War Luis Mena, who was more ambivalent to the 
United States, began a  revolt  against  Nicaraguan  President  
 
                                                 
11 Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-
1921, 13. 
12 For some of the best overviews of the Nicaraguan interventions see 
Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921, 
160 - 210; Isaac Cox, Nicaragua and the United States 1909 - 1927 
(Boston, MA: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 1927); Michel Gobat, 
Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule, 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), pt. II & III. 
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Adolfo Diaz, who was broadly supportive of the Dawson 
Pacts and American financial reorganization.  
 
The political positions of the belligerents made it easy to 
view this conflict as a dispute over the future of American 
policy for Nicaragua.  At the initial outbreak of hostilities, 
the U.S. Navy landed a small force to enter Managua as a 
legation guard, hoping this would intimidate Mena into 
ending the revolution. When Mena responded with a four-
day bombardment of the city, killing over 100 women and 
children plus other casualties, President Taft became 
convinced a larger force was needed and U.S. Marines began 
landing in Nicaragua. The Marines’ initial mission in 
Nicaragua was limited to protecting Americans and they 
remained neutral in the conflicts between the government 
and the rebels, largely because of a disagreement between 
the State Department and the Naval Commanders over the 
purpose of the Marines’ mission in  Nicaragua. American 
Naval Commanders on the scene warned that intervention 
would involve a long commitment to a country where the 
United States had few strategic interests, and so advised that 
the Marines should only be used to bring both sides to the 
negotiating table. State Department officials on the other 
hand wanted to make Nicaragua a test case of the United 
States’ commitment to guaranteeing political and financial 
stability in the Caribbean Basin and so argued that the 
Marines must put down Mena’s revolt. As Assistant 
Secretary of State Huntington-Wilson wrote to president Taft 
in the midst of the struggle with the Department of the Navy 
over intervention: 
 
We are having so much trouble in Mexico, in 
Cuba and in Panama, and we have had for 
so long frequently to express "grave concern" 
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and to lodge protests that what with the 
attitude of Senator Bacon's group in the 
Senate, which gives the impression that we 
are a house divided against itself, the 
authority of our words seems lessened. We 
think that if the United States did its duty 
promptly, thoroughly, and impressively in 
Nicaragua, it would strengthen our hand and 
lighten our task, not only in Nicaragua itself 
in the future, but throughout Central America 
and the Caribbean and would even have 
some moral effect in Mexico. Such 
consideration in addition to real 
apprehension for American citizens, 
especially in Matagalpa, and a feeling that 
excessive prudence was better than the risk 
of any untoward incident, have made this 
Department favor the most adequate 
preparations even if they should prove to 
have been out of proportion to the 
necessities.
13
 
 
In his letter to President Taft, Huntington-Wilson assigned a 
greater importance to the Nicaraguan  situation than was 
justified by arguing that the United States needed to end the 
revolution there in order to send a message to the rest of the 
Caribbean Basin about what would and would not be 
tolerated, which would by extension send a message to 
Europeans that the United States was in control of the 
                                                 
13
 Assistant Secretary of State Wilson to President Taft, August 30th 
1912, doc. no. 817.00/1940a in United States, Records of the Department 
of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Nicaragua, 1910-29, (Washington  
D.C.: The National Archives  National Archives and Records Service 
General Services Administration, 1966), Roll 12. 
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Caribbean. By  making his argument this way, Huntington-
Wilson made Nicaragua into  a symbol of the ills of the 
Caribbean Basin and the fears and ambitions the American 
policymakers had regarding that region and made a conflict 
that the United States should have been able to avoid into a 
test of principle that seemed to important to ignore. His 
reference to “preparations... out of proportion to the 
necessities” indicates that he did not think the intervention 
would be too costly or complicated. 
 
The then U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua George T. Weitzel 
explained the choice facing the United States in similar 
terms.  He told Secretary Knox if the United States acted 
decisively to stop Mena’s revolution it would have a 
"beneficial and lasting effect, not only in Nicaragua but 
throughout Central America." Furthermore, Weitzel argued 
that the United States had a responsibility to act, writing that 
“This is a disagreeable but none the less clear duty which we 
owe to our own self-respect and to Nicaragua which pleads 
for relief and to the cause of civilization and humanity in 
general.”14 Incredibly Weitzel described the situation facing 
the United States as a crisis in which they had to take a 
symbolic stand for the cause of civilization, not as a choice 
between rescuing or not a poorly thought out scheme for the 
financial reorganization of Nicaragua—a place of minor 
financial and strategic importance even by Caribbean Basin 
standards. The convergence between the Nicaraguan 
situation and the more general fears and goals of American 
foreign policy combined with the perceived low cost of 
interventions there made a major issue out of a very minor 
revolution.  
 
                                                 
14 Ambassador Weitzel to Secretary Knox, September 17th, 1912, doc. 
no. 817.00/1988, Ibid. 
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The interventions of Dollar Diplomacy turned out to be 
neither cheap nor easy. While the casualties caused by the 
interventions in the Caribbean Basin were low by 20th 
Century standards, they greatly damaged U.S. relations with 
Latin America, as many Latin Americans failed to see any 
great distinctions between American interventionism and 
European colonialism. These interventions were also more 
frequently the beginning of a long entanglement rather than a 
quick solution to the political problems of the Caribbean 
Basin. Despite these high costs, there was little to show for 
these interventions.15 By the early 1930s the policy itself was 
looking more like a security threat to the United States as it 
damaged hemispheric unity and cooperation just as the rise 
of Germany and Japan was becoming apparent. For the sake 
of hemispheric cooperation the interventionist policy of 
Dollar Diplomacy was explicitly disavowed by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt during the first term of his presidency 
and replaced by what he called “The Good Neighbor” policy. 
At the 1933 International Conference of American States 
held in Montevideo, Uruguay, President Roosevelt 
announced that the United States would renounce its right to 
intervene in Latin America in exchange for greater 
cooperation from Latin American countries on hemispheric 
defense.16 This new policy was generally regarded with favor 
in Latin America and between 1932 and 1954 the United 
States government refrained from intervening.  
 
The U.S. sustained the principles of the Good Neighbor 
                                                 
15 True European incursions into Caribbean Basin had been avoided, but 
many at the time questioned how serious this threat was in the first place. 
American financial supervision did have some positive effects, but it had 
not made any of the countries that received it particularly prosperous. 
16 Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York, 
NY:  Columbia University Press, 1961). Especially part III. 
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Policy until 1954, when the fears and challenges of the Cold 
War ushered in a new era of American interventions. The 
U.S. interventions during the Cold War were different from 
those of the Dollar Diplomacy era in many ways. They were 
ostensibly covert and so, used proxies rather than actual 
American forces, and when they employed American 
personnel, it was often members of the clandestine services 
rather than uniformed soldiers or marines. This is one of the 
reasons the interventions of the Cold War have a more 
odious reputation than those of previous eras. American 
officials routinely argued during the Dollar Diplomacy era 
that they were unashamedly intervening to defend principles 
rather than narrow national interests. Architects of 
intervention in the Cold War would occasionally attempt to 
make the same claim, but the secretive nature of the 
interventions and frequent disavowals of them seemed to 
indicate otherwise.  
 
A striking similarity between the interventions of the Dollar 
Diplomacy era and those of the Cold War is how fears about 
Latin America again converged with the broader fears of 
American foreign policy to make Latin American political 
developments seem more dangerous than they probably 
were. For the thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
1963 the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba did make Latin 
America the “most dangerous place on earth” as Kennedy 
called it.17 However, the Cuban missile crisis took place 
after, and in response to American interventions that 
attempted to overthrow Fidel Castro in 1961 (the Bay of Pigs 
invasion) and successfully overthrew the Arbenz 
Administration in Guatemala in 1954. Some interpretations 
                                                 
17 Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. 
Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 7. 
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of the overthrow of the Arbenz regime focused on the 
machinations of the United Fruit Company and the 
importance of American financial interests in the 
Guatemalan intervention, but more recent scholarship has 
discounted this as a major motivation of the CIA and has 
instead focused on the ideological threat of Arbenz’s pro-
Soviet ideology.18 Arbenz came to power in the middle of the 
Korean War and since American policymakers had 
committed themselves to stopping the spread of communism 
in far away Korea,  it was difficult for them to be indifferent 
to its  spread in Guatemala or to see that the two contexts 
were different.19 It was the convergence between the 
American fears about the spread of communism in Asia and 
its presence in Latin America which caused them to view 
Arbenz as a threat to U.S security; a proposition that without 
this convergence would have seemed ridiculous. 
Unfortunately viewing Arbenz as a threat and treating him as 
such became a self-fulfilling prophecy as future communist 
regimes in Latin America came to power weary of the United 
States and more willing to look to the Soviets for support.  
 
 
                                                 
18 For economic interpretations of the intervention see Jos.  M Aybar de 
Soto, Dependency and Intervention: The Case of Guatemala in 1954 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978); Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter 
Fruit; For more ideological interpretations see Nick Cullather, Secret 
History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala 
1952-1954 (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Piero 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United 
States, 1944 -1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); 
Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of 
Intervention (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982). 
19 Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, 1st ed. 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 152; Gleijeses, “Shattered 
Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944 -1954,” 
178 - 81. 
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That the overthrow of Arbenz was successful beyond 
expectations led to a shift in American thinking back in favor 
of interventions. Once again interventions came to be 
thought of as relatively easy and cheap ways to guarantee 
American interests in Latin America. Unfortunately the 
Kennedy Administration misinterpreted the CIA’s 
involvement, rather than the active support of the 
Guatemalan army, as the key to the success of the overthrow 
of Arbenz; a mistake that greatly contributed to the fiasco of 
the Bay of Pigs Invasion.20 As disastrous as it was, the Bay 
of Pigs did not destroy the American belief that it should be 
able to effect change in Latin America more easily than it 
could other places. Although the Kennedy Administration 
never fully gave up on trying to destroy the Cuban regime, it 
did change tactics when combating communism across the 
hemisphere. Rather than waiting for communist regimes to 
come to power, Kennedy tried to preempt them through his 
major initiative for Latin America, the Alliance for Progress. 
This highly ambitious project, based on the best thinking 
about development at the time, tried to make non-communist 
development a reality across Latin America. Latin America 
was chosen, as Kennedy told an aide because “Latin America 
is  not like Asia or Africa. We can really accomplish 
something there.”21 The perceived convergence between 
Latin American communists and a Soviet dominated global 
communist movement stoked fears in the United States about 
political change in Latin America throughout the Cold War, 
while a belief that Latin America was a place Americans 
could “really accomplish something” drove interventionists 
policies.  
 
The invasion of Panama in 1989 is the most recent U.S. 
                                                 
20 Cullather, Secret History, 7 - 8. 
21 Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 30. 
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action in Latin America and may be the best example of what 
future interventions in Latin America would look like. 
Operation Just Cause was the first, and so far only, unilateral 
U.S. intervention in Latin America in the post-Cold War 
era.22 In many ways Operation Just Cause was more similar 
to the interventions of the Dollar Diplomacy era than to 
those of the Cold War and argues against the notion that 
strategic denial of access to Latin America of rival super 
powers has been the determining factor in American 
interventions in Latin America. Similar to the interventions 
of Dollar Diplomacy, the American policymakers believed 
Panama’s head of state, Manuel Noriega’s drug running, 
political repression, and antagonistic actions were threats to 
law and order in Central America and to American personnel 
in Panama. There was no fear that  he might become an 
agent of a foreign power. Still, then Vice-President George 
H. W. Bush advocated vigorous action against Noriega on 
the grounds that “How can we make the argument we're 
getting tough on drug dealers it we let this guy off?”23 
Associating Noriega with the newly invigorated war on 
drugs in the late 1980s was a critical part of making the case 
to remove him.  
 
U.S. relations with Noriega worsened once George H. W. 
Bush became president. Noriega’s repression of democratic 
movements intensified and clashes between Panamanian and 
American soldiers became more frequent, even involving 
some casualties.24 These pressures came to a head in October 
                                                 
22 Eytan Gilboa, “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of 
Force in the Post Cold War Era,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 
(1996): 539. 
23 James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 
1989-1992 (New York, NY: Putnam, 1995), 179. 
24 The option of dealing with Noriega in the Organization of American 
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of 1989 when an attempted coup by some of Noriega’s own 
officers failed and the Bush Administration was sharply 
criticized for failing to decisively aid the plotters. The Bush 
Administration was in fact sympathetic with the officers, but 
the coup leaders themselves only asked for minimal 
American help and constant American fears that the plot was 
a trap set by Noriega to show the world the extent of 
American aggression hampered cooperation.
25
 Warranted or 
not, the coup was portrayed as a failure of the Bush 
Administration and as the crisis grew more serious focus, 
shifted from Panama to the ability of the Bush 
Administration to wage the war on drugs, promote 
democracy in Latin America, and to lead the free world in an 
era when the international context seemed opportune for 
American leadership.
26
 In this environment, the costs of not 
removing Noriega seemed to be higher than the cost of 
intervention and so the Administration determined that at the 
next opportunity the United States would act decisively.  
 
The death of an American Marine, the beating of another, 
and the sexual assault of the latter’s wife by the Panamanian 
Defense Forces all in the same incident was sufficient to 
convince the Bush Administration to order the overthrow of 
Noriega  and execute the largest U.S. intervention in Latin 
America in American history. Although the security of the 
Panama Canal was occasionally mentioned in justifications 
of the intervention, the argument that Noriega posed a threat 
                                                                                                    
States (OAS) was also tried, but disagreements between member states 
kept the OAS from being effective in this situation.  
25
 Lawrence Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Origins, 
Planning, and Crisis Management, June 1987-December 1989 
(Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2008), 
256. 
26
 Gilboa, “The Panama Invasion Revisited,” 558. 
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to American security was never seriously considered. 
Noriega did, however, pose a clear threat to the safety of 
American citizens in Panama, especially those in uniform. 
As James Baker explained in his memoirs, American 
policymakers decided to remove Noriega after they came to 
the conclusion that American lives would continue to be lost 
whether or not they attempted the coup, and so it was better 
to go ahead and remove him, which might permanently 
resolve the issue.
27
 A key assumption in this calculation was 
that no more than a few Americans would be killed in this 
action and here again the perceived differences in power 
between the United States and Latin American nations 
played a key role in the decision to intervene. In the case of 
Panama, however, American policymakers seemed to have 
been right. The overthrow of Noriega did prove to be a 
relatively simple operation, and, almost unique among 
American interventions in Latin America. It resulted in the 
establishment of a democracy rather than an authoritarian 
regime. At some point in the future, if pressure to intervene 
in Latin America reemerges, the Panamanian intervention 
will surely be cited by proponents of interventions as an 
example of what such actions can achieve.  
 
The forgoing selective survey of American interventions in 
Latin America has argued that while American strategic and 
economic interests in the region play a role in the decision to 
intervene, other factors need to be included to give a 
plausible explanation for the frequency of American 
interventions. These additional factors are (1) that the vast 
differences in size, wealth, and perceived influence between 
the United States and the republics of Latin America made  
intervening there seem relatively low risk and (2) that 
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interventions are  much  more  likely  when  the general fears  
and aspirations of American foreign policy converge with 
particular American fears and aspirations regarding Latin 
America.  
 
LOOKING FORWARD 
 
Surveying Latin America today it is reasonable to assume 
that the conditions that have discouraged unilateral American 
interventions there for the last twenty-two years might 
continue for sometime. One of these conditions is that during 
that time the major issues of U.S. foreign policy have not 
converged with the major issues in U.S.-Latin American 
relations. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s the issues that have dominated American foreign 
policy have been failed states and international terrorism, 
neither of which is currently a major issue in U.S.-Latin 
American relations. With American attention focused on the 
Middle East and South Asia, the issues of drug-trafficking 
that currently prevail in the region and the reemergence of 
leftists regimes in Latin America have not gained much 
prominence in the United States, even though these are two 
issues that have previously been used to justify interventions. 
Also the two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have turned 
the mood of the American people decisively against military 
interventions that might entail a long commitment. However, 
it would be naïve to assume that the United States will never 
again pursue a policy of unilateral intervention in Latin 
America. The rest of this section will be devoted to three 
possible scenarios that might lead to the reemergence of a 
policy of intervention. 
 
These last two decades of U.S.-Latin American relations 
have not passed without challenges to American interests in 
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the region, the bulk of them coming from Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Alternative for 
the Americas. However,  there seems little danger of  
Venezuela playing the role in the coming decades that Cuba 
under Fidel Castro played in Latin America in the 1960s. 
While inequality is still rampant in many Latin American 
countries, the anti-poverty programs of regional leaders such 
as Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Mexico’s Oportunidades 
seemed to offer a more compelling development model for 
most Latin American countries than Hugo Chávez’s 21st 
Century Socialism.28 This is no doubt partially attributable to 
the fact that under Hugo Chávez Venezuela’s economic 
health has declined as his autocratic tendencies have 
increased, alienating many Latin American countries that do 
not directly profit from Venezuela’s petroleum wealth. 
Neither have Hugo Chávez’s 21st Century Socialism or 
Bolivian Revolution become major issues in the United 
States, despite what at times seems like a concerted effort on 
Chávez’s part to make them such. He has publicly and 
proudly sought to make common cause with other nations 
that espouse anti-American views,  such as Iran,  and has 
even invited the Russian Navy to undertake joint exercises 
with Venezuela, actions that would have alarmed American 
policymakers during the Cold War.29 
 
The muted American response to Chávez may be because 
American policymakers have learned valuable lessons 
                                                 
28 “Happy families: An anti-poverty scheme invented in Latin America is 
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regarding the long-term diplomatic and political costs of 
intervention—even of those that seem successful in the short 
term. However, a greater part of the explanation is likely that 
despite all of his rhetoric and bombast, fears about Hugo 
Chávez do not converge with the broader issues of American 
foreign policy. Since the Al-Qaeda attacks on New York on 
September 11, 2001, the United States has faced an enemy so 
dedicated in its opposition to everything American and so 
determined to kill Americans and their allies abroad that in 
comparison Hugo Chávez, seems quaint and at times 
comedic.  
 
The past however is no guarantee that Chávez will not 
become a target of American intervention in the future. The 
American led and then supported international mission 
against Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi may influence 
American views on interventions in support of democracy 
for the next several decades to come. The intervention 
against Qaddafi has reminded American policymakers that 
when it comes to responding to calls to protect democracy 
they have a range of responses available to them besides 
doing nothing or undertaking an Iraq-style nation building 
mission, which will likely remain unpopular for several 
decades. In Libya, the United States led a coalition that was 
willing to offer air support and supplies to a rebel group in 
order to support a regime change, but was unwilling to 
deploy any forces to ensure the success of the mission or to 
control the composition of the new regime after victory. The 
Libyan intervention was a definite departure from what was 
informally known as the “Pottery Barn Doctrine” (“you 
break it you buy it”) propagated by Colin Powell and other 
less hawkish  members of the Bush Administration, which 
argued that once the United States intervened they needed to 
see the mission through, presumably to an acceptable 
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(loosely defined) outcome.30 In Libya the Obama 
Administration has demonstrated its willingness to “break 
things” without “buying” them and as a result interventions 
no longer seem as expensive as they did even just a few 
years ago. There has already been some talk of Libya 
becoming a template for future American interventions.31 
Such talk is directly relevant to U.S.-Latin American 
relations because Libya could be used as a precedent to 
justify some sort of action against a leader such as Chávez if 
he would attempt to maintain himself in power after loosing 
a future election. This could theoretically happen as early as 
2012.  If violence erupted in a similar manner as in Libya 
and pro-democracy protesters appealed to the United States 
to support them against Chávez, the pressure on American 
policymakers to intervene in some fashion could be great, 
especially with Libya offering an example of what a cheap 
and effective intervention might look like. 
 
Another possible scenario that could lead to the reemergence 
of a policy of unilateral intervention would be a renewal of 
superpower rivalries in the region. A constant theme in 
current discussions of American foreign policy is the rise of 
China, and what that means for the United States. Even if 
China’s rise turned out to be less than benign there are 
several reasons why it would be unlikely to spark a new Cold 
War between the U.S. and China in Latin America. Perceived 
Soviet gains in Latin America were so alarming for 
Americans because they represented a failure of the liberal 
political and economic ideology promoted by the United 
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States and its allies. China’s rise, if anything, seems to prove 
the validity of liberal economic principals. Even if a liberal 
political ideology has not taken hold in China, the Chinese 
do not seem eager to export their own brand of 
authoritarianism, and even if they did it is far from certain 
that it would find fertile ground in Latin America. However, 
China’s rise may well lead to competition in Latin America 
with the United States which might have unforeseen 
consequences, but it is unlikely that this competition would 
spark the type of conflict that would lead to unilateral 
American interventions. Political scientist and Sino-Latin 
America relations specialists He Li, writes that China’s 
relationship with the United States is so much more 
important than anything they would likely gain from 
aggressively expanding into Latin America, that they will 
likely maintain a cautious Latin American policy.32 
 
Still there are those who view international politics as a zero 
sum game and so China’s investments in Latin America 
represent a loss of American influence in the region and a 
potential security threat.33 While this is still a minority view, 
the outbreak of a conflict in Asia that saw the U.S. and China 
on  opposite sides could quickly and drastically change 
perceptions of Chinese influence in Latin America, similar to 
the way the outbreak of the Korean War shifted American 
perceptions of Soviet influence in the region. If the Cold War 
was able to turn Guatemala into a security threat, conflict 
between the United States and China would almost certainly 
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turn Venezuela, by one metric the largest recipient of 
Chinese aid and investment in Latin America, into a major 
worry for American policymakers.34 
 
Finally, the expansion of drug cartels into Central America is 
another scenario that could lead to a reemergence of U.S. 
intervention in the region. The aggressive actions taken by 
the Mexican government in the last few years against drug 
cartels has pushed many of them out of Mexico and into 
places like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.35 The 
drug cartels’ ability to infiltrate local governments and law 
enforcement in Mexico was one of the most frightening 
examples of their power and if the Mexican state, which is 
strong by comparison, was susceptible to such infiltration the 
threats to these Central American governments are grave.  
 
The danger of a narco-state developing in Central America is 
perhaps the most likely scenario for the reemergence of a 
policy of American intervention in the region, for several 
reasons. First, for nearly twenty years the United States has 
taken an especially firm stance on narcotics, which has 
focused as much on interdicting foreign supply as on curbing 
domestic demand. While this type of war on drugs has been 
far from successful, it appears to have succeeded in breaking 
the power of the Colombian cartels. This limited success 
could serve as a template and a precedent for the U.S. 
military to take aggressive action in Central America if the 
cartels began to expand their influence there. Second, though 
                                                 
34 For information on Chinese investment in Venezuela see Thomas Lum, 
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America has many partners in its war on drugs, this 
cooperation is typically bilateral. Given the relative 
weakness of the States of Central America it is likely that 
any bilateral cooperation with the United States to combat 
the drug trade would be in fact American dominated 
initiatives that could lead to greater involvement in their 
internal affairs. It is possible to imagine a scenario where 
American policymakers believe the governments of these 
States to be so compromised that it would pursue unilateral 
action to combat the trade. Third, these cartels’ reputation for 
brutal violence and mass killing along with the damage their 
trade does to American society could nullify what otherwise 
might be strong domestic opposition to any intervention in 
Central America, especially if Americans believe the 
problem could be taken care of quickly. Those Americans 
who demand increasingly harsh sentencing for drug 
defenders domestically would surely argue, as President H. 
W. Bush did against Noriega, that the United States cannot 
win the war on drugs at home if they lose it in Central 
America. They could also cite Operation Just Cause as a 
precedent that unilateral interventions in such cases can be 
effective, relatively low cost, and even popular.  
 
American policymakers are not oblivious to the dangers of 
the drug trade moving into Central America and have been 
working with governments in the region to combat the trade 
and prevent further penetration.36 Recognizing the problem 
early and formulating a response to it is certainly better than 
being caught unaware, but it is not necessarily a sure way of 
preventing the need for intervention or further involvement. 
Taking a firm stance against drug cartels in Central America 
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could be the first step towards a policy where the United 
States assumes responsibility for Central American security. 
A similar sequence of events happened at the Washington 
Conference of 1907 when Central American leaders and 
American diplomats gathered to sign agreements intended to 
end revolutions in there. The leaders agreed to stay neutral in 
Central American civil wars and also to deny recognition to 
any regimes that came to power through revolution.
37
 
Contrary to expectations, the agreements did not prevent 
revolutions but did place more pressure on the United States 
to act to prevent them since the United States assumed the 
unofficial role of the guarantor of the agreements signed.
38
 
Decisive involvement in issues in Latin America for the U.S. 
has sometimes been a recipe for future interventions rather 
than quicker solutions.  
 
That none of these scenarios seem especially imminent is a 
testament to the development of the U.S.- Latin American 
relationship in the past several years and also an 
acknowledgement that American foreign policy has been, 
and still is, largely focused elsewhere. Yet, all of these 
scenarios contain a possible set of circumstances that might 
once again bring about a convergence between Latin 
American issues and the major fears and aspirations of 
American foreign policy, and so push Latin American issues 
back up near the top of the American foreign policy agenda. 
Given the perceived low costs intervention in Latin America 
if democracy is threatened, American interests are in danger 
of being supplanted, or drug cartels seem to be on the verge 
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of taking over a small state calls for intervention will surely 
follow and over time could become irresistible.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The frequency of American interventions in Latin America 
cannot be explained by security and economic interests 
alone.  This essay has argued that two other factors need to 
be taken into account to explain why interventions have been 
so common. First, immense differences in size and influence 
between the United States and the States of  Latin America 
make interventions appear to be a low risk solution to crises 
that threaten American interests there. Second, when 
American fears about and aspirations for Latin America 
converge with the general fears and aspirations of American 
foreign policy interventions become much more likely. For 
the last two decades the absence of such a convergence has 
prevented Latin America from gaining the level of 
importance necessary for American policymakers to consider 
intervention as a possible policy response to regional crises. 
However, the foundation on which previous policies of 
intervention have been built still exists and so it would be 
overly optimistic to think such a policy could not reemerge.  
 
Robert Pastor described U.S.-Latin American relations as a 
“whirlpool” in 2001, but argued persuasively that it was a 
trap that both parties could exit by shifting their perceptions 
of each other and their definitions of sovereignty.39 Ten years 
later, whether the United States and Latin America have 
permanently “exited” this whirlpool is still unclear. During 
the twenty-two years of the Good Neighbor policy, 
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interventions seemed to be consigned to the past, only to 
reemerge suddenly when the fear of communism proliferated 
during the early Cold War. Time will tell whether the 
Western Hemisphere has truly entered a new era in its inter-
state relations, or whether the past twenty-two years have 
been another long hiatus from an American interventionists 
policy while it was occupied elsewhere. The U.S. response to 
the next major crisis in U.S.-Latin American relations where 
the issues in question converge with the broader issues of 
American foreign policy will go some way towards 
answering this question. 
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